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DIGEST OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
COOPERATIVES - GRAZING ASSOCIATION - CAPACITY TO HOLD TITLE
MARCH 1, 1966
HONORABLE CHARLES TIGHE, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
Whether a non-profit cooperative grazing association may own
real and personal property?
Section 36-08-02 of the Century Code provides that a non-profit
cooperative grazing association is to be operated under the general
law governing cooperatives, which is set out in Chapter 10-15.
Chapter 36-08, which pertains to grazing associations, says nothing
concerning the owning of property, while § 10-15-03 (4) provides that
a cooperative may acquire property As the right to acquire property
includes the right to hold property, a grazing association may own
and dispose of real and personal property as it sees fit.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-FLUORIDATION-EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER
MARCH 8, 1966
CITY ATTORNEY, HAZEN, NORTH DAKOTA
Whether a municipality may legally provide for fluoridation of
its water supply where same is not expressly authorized by any
state statute?
Fluoridation projects are, as a general rule, valid exercises of
the police power This is so, whether such power is exercised by the
state legislature, or by the municipality's legislative body Further,
fluoridation has been held not to constitute the unauthorized practice
of medicine. Because the question of fluoridation is controversial,
courts have determined that the decision regarding whether to
fluoridate or not is one of policy which is best left to the discretion
of the city council. Therefore, North Dakota municipalities have
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the power to fluoridate m conjunction with their general power to
regulate the municipal water supply
TAXATION-EVASION-VENUE OF PROSECUTION
MARCH 30, 1966
LLOYD OMDAHL, TAX COMMISSIONER
1. Whether jurisdiction of the offense of failing to file an income
tax return with intent to evade the requirements of law is in
Burleigh County, where the return is to be filed, or in the county of
the taxpayer's residence?
The general rule is that where a crime involves a failure to do
a particular act, "the venue or jurisdiction of the crime is the
location where the act is required to be performed." However, North
Dakota Century Code § 29-03-04 provides that where a crime is com-
mitted partly in one county and partly in another, jurisdiction of
the offense is in either of said counties. In view of the fact that
two elements of the various tax offenses, i.e. intent to evade, and
rendering or signing of fradulent returns, will occur m the county
of residence, jurisdiction of the offenses will be in either county
2. Whether the state's attorney for the particular county must
prosecute the action, or may the special assistant attorneys general
attached to the tax commissioner's staff prosecute same?
The initial responsibility to prosecute offenses against the state
lies with the state's attorney for the particular county involved under
Sections 29-11-07 and 11-16-01 of the Century Code, however, assist-
ant attorneys general, including those on the tax commissioner's
staff "may act for and in behalf of the state's attorney in prosecut-
ing the actions."
3. Whether the tax commissioner is required to give notice to
a taxpayer requesting that he file a return, prior to signing a com-
plaint against said taxpayer 9
Analysis of North Dakota Century Code § 57-38-45 shows that
under subsections 2, 4 and 6 the Commissioner is required to give
notice to the taxpayer before subjecting him to the provisions of
those subsections, however, subsection 3, under which the above-
mentioned complaint would be filed, does not require notice and a
request to file, therefore, the commission is not required to give
such notice prior to commencing a criminal action.
4. Whether the "fine" provided for in Section 57-38-45(2) is a
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civil penalty, and does the tax commissioner have exclusive authority
to impose it?
5. Whether the "penalty of not more than one thousand dollars
to be recovered by the attorney general" under Section 57-38-45(3)
is a civil penalty, and does the tax commissioner have authority
to levy it?
Imposition of a, variable or fixed sum of money as a fine or
penalty for failure to comply with revenue laws is generally con-
sidered a civil penalty, and can be imposed regardless of whether
there has also been a criminal conviction.
The fact that various subsections of tax statutes impose both
civil and criminal sanctions does not violate constitutional guaran-
tees of due process or equal protection. However, if two statutes,
or subsections, impose criminal penalties for the same offense the
above constitutional safeguards are violated due to vagueness, and
unlawful delegation to an administrative agency of choice of penalty
Thus, the "fine" provided for in subsection 2 of Section 57-38-45
is a civil penalty, and may be imposed, after the giving of proper
notice, by the tax commissioner The "penalty" mentioned in sub-
section 3 is also a civil penalty, and may be imposed by the tax
commissioner, and collected in a, civil action in which the commis-
sioner may be represented by special assistant attorneys general
from his office.
6. Whether, under N.D Cent. Code § 57-38-45(6), which allows
the tax commissioner to compute a taxpayer's income, where the
taxpayer has refused, after proper notice, to do so, and provides
that the commissioner "shall assess the same at not more than
double the amount so determined," the doubling of the computed
amount is mandatory or discretionary9 Further, if the tax is
doubled pursuant to subsection 6, do the penalties imposed by Sec-
tion 57-38-45(1) apply to such doubled amount 9
The North Dakota Supreme Court construed the word "shall" in
a property tax statute when used in connection with a provision
designed to enforce collection of a tax as being mandatory in con-
notation. Vetter v Benson, 81 N. W 2d 758 (N. D. 1957) Subsection
6 of Section 57-38-45 is penal in nature and is designed to enforce
collection of a tax, and thus, the tax commissioner must assess the
tax at "not more than double" the amount computed. However,
the phrase "not more than double" would allow the commissioner
to add an amount less than double.
The penalty provided for by Section 57-38-45 (1) cannot be applied
to a tax assessed under subsection 6, as the subsection 1 penalty
applies to a different transgression.
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7 Whether the fact that a fine or penalty is imposed under sub-
sections 2 or 3, or the tax is doubled under subsection 7, prohibits
the application of either or both of the other above-mentioned sub-
sections?
Section 57-38-45 (5) provides that the penalties provided by sub-
sections 3 and 4 can be in addition to all other penalties provided
for in the chapter, thus subsection 3 penalties could be applied in
conjunction with either subsection 6, or subsection 2, but not both.
However, the penalties provided for in subsections 2 and 6 are not
stated to be in addition to other penalties, and as the same basis
is apparent for imposing either, they cannot be used in conjunction
with each other
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LUMP SUM PAYMENT-DISCLOSURE OF.
DETAILS OF AWARD
MAY 9, 1966
CHAIRMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU
1. Whether regular payments to a permanent totally, or perman-
ent partially disabled claimant are to be continued on a weekly
basis following a partial lump sum payment, or are weekly payments
to be discontinued until the time in which the lump sum payment
would be used up at the regular rate?
Section 65-05-25 does not provide for a specific manner in which
the Bureau is to make partial lump sum awards. The Supreme
Court has apparently indicated that the matter of continuing regular
payment following a partial lump sum award is to be left to the
sound discretion of the Bureau. Gotchy v North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 49 N.D. 915, 194 N.W 663 (1923)
2. Whether Section 65-04-15 of the Century Code prohibits the
disclosure of the details of an award made to persons other than
the claimant and his employer 9
The Bureau functions in a dual capacity, first, as the equivalent
of an insurance company, and, second, as an administrative agency
which hears and determines claims. Normally, when the Bureau
functions as an insurer, its records would be as private as any
other insurance company However, section 44-04-18 provides that,
"except as otherwise specifically provided," all records of public
boards, agencies, etc., shall be open for public inspection. As there
is nothing in title 65 (the Workmen's Compensation Title) which ex-
empts the records of claims paid from the operation of Section 44-





CHAIRMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU
Whether the Bureau can make payments to cover the cost of
a medical evaluation to determine which are of vocational rehabilita-
tion a claimant should enter, as distinguished from payment of the
costs of such vocational rehabilitation?
Section 65-02-14 of the Century Code provides that the Bureau
may cooperate with other agencies interested in the rehabilitation
of the injured person. Section 65-05-07 authorizes the Bureau to
determine whether or not an injured employee should receive courses
of study, training or education in order that said employee might
be rehabilitated.
In order to make the above determination, the Bureau must ex-
ercise sound judgment. In order to exercise sound judgment, the
Bureau must be well informed concerning what will 'be best for the
injured employee. This information can only come from qualified
medical and rehabilitation personnel. As the Bureau needs this in-
formation to exercise sound judgment, the Bureau is impliedly
authorized to pay for it.
ESTATE TAX-DETERMINATION-REPRESENTATION OF NON-RESIDENT
DECEDENT'S ESTATE
JUNE 23, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, OLIVER COUNTY
1. Whether an estate tax determination must be made by a
county court, subject to the tax commissioner's approval, where the
property is left by a non-resident decedent:
a. If a probate proceeding has been commenced prior to the
filing of an application for estate tax determination;
b. If the application for estate tax determination has been filed
before probate proceedings are begun?
Under N.D Cent. Code 57-37-13 (1960) the county court "shall"
assess the estate tax payable, and the tax commissioner shall ap-
prove said determination under N.D Cent. Code § 57-37-26 (1960)
The state tax commissioner may, where there has been no com-
mencement of probate proceedings, make a determination of estate
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tax due upon request of an administrator, excutor, or grantee under
a conveyance made during the grantor's lifetime. Thus, where pro-
bate proceedings have been commenced the county court must make
the estate tax determination, and, if probate proceedings have not
been commenced, the tax commissioner may determine the estate
tax [N.D Cent. Code § 57-37-27 (Supp. 1965)] However, the tax
commissioner does not have "exclusive" jurisdiction for a particular
type of gross estate of non-resident decedent, that is, the county
court is not ousted of its jurisdiction to make an estate tax deter-
mmation for any particular kind of gross estate.
2. Whether there is any situation in which the county court of
a particular county has exclusive jurisdiction to make an estate tax
determination, subject to the tax commissioner's approval, for the
property of a non-resident decedent if some or all of the property
is located m that particular county9
Where the tax is not adjusted within four months of the death,
and the tax commissioner has requested the proper county court
to appoint an administrator, that county court has jurisdiction to
determine the tax not only on property located in that county, but
on property of said non-resident decedent located anywhere in the
state. This is so, even though such property is not subject to probate.
3. Whether a non-resident attorney, who is not licensed to prac-
tice in North Dakota, is authorized on behalf of the non-resident
decedent's estate, to conduct in county court the "estate tax matter,"
and the "probate matter," if a probate is necessary)
Section 27-11-02 of the Century Code vests in the Supreme Court
the power to admit persons to practice as attorneys. By Rule 1,
the Supreme Court stated the qualifications for admittance to prac-
tice before the district courts of the state, but no similar rule was
promulgated in regard to the county courts.
Section 27-11-27 provides that a "member of the bar of another
state actually engaged" in a "matter pending in any court in this
state" may be permitted to appear and conduct said matter How-
ever, the phrase "matter pending" requires that the action be in-
stituted by an attorney licensed in North Dakota. Although the pro-
bate code does not require pleadings as such, a probate action is a
"matter pending" within the above Section; therefore, a North Dakota
licensed attorney must institute the action, and the court may permit
an associated non-resident attorney to carry on.
4. Whether the person who handles an estate tax matter before
the county court or the tax commissioner must be an attorney
Although the preparation of income tax returns and the answer-
ing of certain legal questions collateral to such preparation is not
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generally considered the practice of law, the preparation of estate
tax returns is to be distinguished on the ground that instructions for
filing of estate tax returns are not available for lay consumption,
as they are in the income tax case. Therefore, a person engaged
in preparing estate tax returns in this state must be a licensed
North Dakota attorney
STATE-CONTINGENCY FUND-ALLOCATION OF FUNDS THEREFROM TO
AID IN EMERGENCIES
JULY 1, 1966
GOVERNOR WILLIAM L. GUY
Whether the State Emergency Commission can allocate funds
from the contingency fund to counties and municipalities to help
offset the costs of reconstruction of public works damaged by flood
water
In view of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in
Backman v Guy, 126 N.W.2d 910 (1964), holding the transfer of
money between funds (as authorized by Chap. 54-16 N.D.C.C.) to be
limited to emergencies arising within established funds and depart-
ments for which appropriations have already been made, the
opinion concluded that the State Emergency Commission cannot al-
locate funds directly to political subdivisions of the state.
The opinion also noted that, although direct assistance must be
authorized by the legislature, the National Guard might be called
out in a case of emergency and funds for their services might be
derived from the Contingency Fund.
SCHOOLS-SCHOOL BOARD SINKING FUND-INVESTMENT OF
SURPLUS FUNDS
JULY 7, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, GRANT COUNTY
Whether a school board with a population over one thousand,
has the authority to invest surplus funds in its sinking fund in
United States Treasury Bills or in Certificates of Deposit in State
or National Banks.
The opinion concluded that, under section 21-03-43 of the Cen-
tury Code, the school board may so invest its surplus m certifi-
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cates of deposit of State or National Banks, but only in those banks,
"which have been selected as official depositories of the school
district in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21-04 of the
North Dakota Century Code." A treasury bill, however, is not
an "interest bearing bond of the United States" as required by
section 21-03-43 (2), hence these may not be invested in by the
school district.
CITIES AND VILLAGES - POWERS - PROVIDING POLICE FIRE
PROTECTION BEYOND CITY LIMITS
JULY 13, 1966
CITY ATTORNEY, BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA
Whether a city has legal authority to contract or furnish
police or fire services beyond its corporate limits.
As to police services, the opinion concluded that these could
not be contracted for or furnished except within the city limits
and for a distance of one and one-half miles in all directions there-
from as provided in section 40-25-05 of the Century Code. Further,
whether a city could provide these services for a federal military
enclave even within the above limits would depend upon whether
the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction for law enforcement
thereon, has, in some way been ceded back to the state.
With regard to fire services and protection, the opinion con-
cluded that, under section 40-05-01 (37) of the Century Code, "a city
may contract to provide fire protection outside the city limits
whether such protection is furnished to private or governmental
property, including that of the United States." This opinion was
expressed although the statute provides for fire attendance and
assistance "to other municipalities within or without this state, or
to private property including farm buildings located outside the
city limits."
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, CIVIL-PROVISION FOR PAYMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES - VOID IN SECURITY AGREEMENT
JULY 15, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, DIVIDE COUNTY
Whether.a provision as to the payment of attorney's fees would
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be allowed in a security agreement under the North Dakota Uni-
form Commercial Code.
In view of the amendment of section 28-26-04 of the Century
Code to include "Security Agreement" and the fact that such amend-
ment was part of the same law by which the Uniform Commercial
Code was enacted, the opinion expessed the belief that, as in the
case of notes, bonds, and other evidence of debt, a provision in a
security agreement for the payment of attorney's fees is against
public policy and void.
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION-LICENSE TO SOLICIT-BUSINESS AS A
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
JULY 20, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, BURLEIGH COUNTY
Whether Chapter 50-22 of the North Dakota Century Code is ap-
plicable to certain transcient or temporary businesses advertising
that all or a percentage of their sales or net profits are for the
benefit of certain charities.
The basic prohibition of Chapter 50-22 is that "no charitable or-
ganization shall solicit contributions from persons in this state by
any means whatsoever without first having obtaned a license from
the secretary of state." This coupled with the definition of "charitable
organization" and "contribution" (50-22-01 (2) (3) N.D.C.C. Supp.
1965), led the opinion to conclude that this practice in advertising
was not "inherently different from that of the average permanently
located merchant in displaying an appropriate symbol or sticker in
his store window to show that such business has made the appropriate
contribution to obtain such symbol or sticker "
COUNTIES-COUNTY JUSTICE-QUALIFICATIONS AND TENURE
JULY 25, 1966
ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY, PEMBINA COUNTY
1. Whether an unlicensed attorney of the State of North Dakota
may circulate petitions and file for the office of County Justice.
The qualifications and term of office of the county justice as
set out in section 27-18-02 provide that: "the county justice shall be
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licensed to practice law in this state " Although noting that
section 27-18-06 provides for an alternate procedure of appointment
by the board of county commissioners when a qualified person is
not available or will not accept the position, the opinion concluded
that a person, not licensed to practice law in North Dakota is not
eligible to run for the office of County Justice.
2. Whether one duly appointed to the office but not a licensed
attorney would be required to give up his office in favor of a
qualified attorney who wished the job.
If an unqualified person does accept an appointment to the of-
fice under the alternate procedure provided by section 27-18-06, this
appointment would be for the full term of two years or if an interim
appointment, for the remaining portion thereof. The opinion notes
that the provisions of section 27-18-06 do not imply otherwise and
that any other approach to the problem, would in all likelihood lead
only to uncertainty, confusion and a generally unfavorable atmo-
sphere for the administration of the office.
MOTOR VEHICLES-EQUIPMENT-SAFETY CHAINS AND BRAKES ON
TRAILERS
AUGUST 9, 1966
NORTH DAKOTA HIGHWAY PATROL, BISMARCK,
NORTH DAKOTA
Whether all trailers, with reference to subsection 3 of section
39-21-32, are required to have safety chains or brakes.
Section 39-21-32 (3) requiring trailers and semi-trailers (as de-
fined by section 39-01-01) to be equipped with safety chains or
brakes, coupled with section 39-18-04, requiring the same as to mo-
bile homes and house trailers, leads the opinion to conclude that
all trailers operating in the highways of this state must be equipped
with safety chains or brakes if operated at speeds in excess of fif-
teen miles per hour
STATE-PUBLIC MONEYS-HIGHWAY FUNDS
AUGUST 11, 1966
MR. ROBERT VAALER, ATTORNEY
GRAND FORKS, COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
Whether or not the expenditure of funds by the State Highway
Department for an opening through a highway for drain purposes
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pursuant to 61-21-31, would contravene the intent of Article 56 of
the constitution of North Dakota.
The intent of Article 56 of the State Constitution is "to prevent
any use of the gas revenues for other than highway purposes."
Section 61-21-31 provides that the State Highway Department, "shall
make necessary openings through such road or highway," when the
board of drainage commissioners notifies the department that such
are needed.
The opinion, citing Bergen Township v Nelson County, 33 N.D.
247, 156 N.W 559 (1915), concludes that the necessity of such an
opening, when properly decided upon by the board of drainage com-
missioners, cannot be questioned. Further, the presence of the man-
datory word, "shall," in section 61-21-31, and the belief that the
openings are "clearly for highway purposes," lead to the conclusion
that there is no conflict with the intention of Article 56.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION-POWERS-PENALTIES FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE .
AUGUST 18, 1966
SECRETARY, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA
Whether the Public Service Commission has the authority to im-
pose monetary penalties upon utilities which violate a provision under
Title 49-07 or a commission rule or regulation.
There being no special authorization for such a penalty in either
Chapter 49-02 or any other provision of the North Dakota Century
Code, the opinion concludes that the Public Service Commission can-
not Impose criminal monetary penalties upon utilities in violation of
Title 49-07 or a commission rule or regulation.
The Commission may compel obedience to its orders by insti-
tuting the proper proceedings in a court having jurisdiction over
the parties or perhaps by imposing a civil monetary penalty, col-
lection of which must be made by resort to the proper legal pro-
ceedings.
TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS FOR DISABLED VETERANS-CONSTRUCTION
AUGUST 19, 1966
STATES ATTORNEY, GRIGGS COUNTY
Whether the real and personal property tax exemption afforded
by section 57-02-08 (20) of the North Dakota Century Code is ap-
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
plicable to the homestead used and owned by the surviving wife.
Under subsection 20 of 57-02-08 of the 1965 supplement, the
phrase, "with a service connected disability greater than fifty per
cent" is meant to modify both the anteceding phrases; "any other
disabled veteran," and a person "who had been retired from the
armed forces of the United States." Thus, for either of these two
classes to be qualified for the exemption, a service connected dis-
ability of fifty per cent or more must be shown.
As is the case with widows of paraplegic disabled veterans, the
unremarried widows of either of the other two classes treated m
subsection 20 may claim the exemption afforded, provided she can
meet the qualifications as to income.
TAXATION-SALES AND USE TAX-PRESERVING OF REcoRDs
AUGUST 22, 1966
R. FAY BROWN, REPRESENTATIVE,
27TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
1. Whether the Tax Commissioner can require production of
records or proof of deductions as to sales or use tax returns prior
to June 30, 1961.
As a result of the 1963 amendment to section 57-39-08, the period
required for keeping and preserving sales tax records was increased
from a period of two years, to a period of six years. In order to
satisfy the provision would require only that records be kept for a
six year period begming two years prior to the amendment of
July 1, 1963, and moving forward as time progresses. The same
result would obtain as to the use tax, due to the 1963 amendment
to section 57-40-08 providing for the preserving of use tax records
for a six year period.
2. Whether the re-sale of property repossessed under a condi-
tional sales contract is subject to sales tax, provided the re-sale
doesn't result in a greater net realization to the merchant.
The re-sale of repossessed property under a conditional sale
contract is a separate transaction and is subject to the tax. Any
tax paid in excess of the amount actually received on the purchase
price from the defaulting buyer, however, may be adjusted or used
for future credit. Also, a conditional sales contract may be treated
as a worthless account within the meaning of section 57-39-04 if taxes
have been collected on the full purchase price when only a portion
of the purchase price has actually been received.
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3. Whether the Tax Commissioner may assess penalties when a
taxpayer files returns in good faith, claiming transactions as exempt
which are later determined to be not exempt and as to which no
disallowance is made by the commissioner for a period of years
after the filing.
The Tax Commissioner is authorized to assess penalties against
retailers failing to file or remit payments. If a delay is excusable,
it is likely that the penalty wouldn't apply It is also noted that any
penalty, unless voluntarily paid, must be enforced through the courts.
The opinion concludes that "courts would take into account extenuat-
ing circumstances and good faith on the part of the retailer in de-
termining whether or not the penalty should apply."
COUNTIES-OFFICE SPACE-PROVISION FOR WITHIN THE COUNTY SEAT
AUGUST 22, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, CASS COUNTY
Whether offices for the County Engineer, County Nurse, and
County Extension Agent, must be provided within the county seat
by virtue of section 11-10-20 of the North Dakota Century Code.
Section 44-04-18 is to be given a broad definition as to which
records shall be public records and hence open and accessible for
inspection by the public. Under such a broad definition of public
records, such non-elected county employees as the County Engineer
and County Nurse are officers who have charge of public records.
The opinion concludes that these officers must be provided office
space within the county seat for this reason.
STATE-STATE BOARDS AND INsTITUTIONs-DUTY OF HEADS THEREOF TO
MAKE REPORTS
SEPTEMBER 8, 1966
GOVERNOR WILLIAM L. GUY
1. Whether the list of all persons required to be made under
section 44-04-08, as amended, should include every individual employ-
ed at any time on either a full or part-time basis during the two
year period ended June 30, 1966.
The requirement that a list of all persons employed be set forth
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in the annual or biennial report of the department now means that
the section is not limited to heads of state institutions and boards,
but covers all departments and offices required by other statutes to
make reports. The report should include every individual employed
at any time dunng the two year period ended June 30, 1966, whether
or not the employment was of a full or part-time nature and whether
or not the persons so employed are employed at the end of the
period. The opinion concludes that the intent of the requirement is
that the published report should indicate every person employed ir-
respective of duration or time of termination. The published list of
persons employed should be limited to those employed during the
two year period ending June 30, 1966.
2. Whether the term "emoluments" include such payments as
mileage of use of a personal car, and per diem payments for meals
and lodging.
The opinion adopts the definition of "emoluments" set out in
State ex rel. Lyons v Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (1961) Under this defini-
tion, the opinion concludes that mileage for the use of a personal
car, reimbursements of airplane or railroad tickets, per diem pay-
ments for meals and lodging, social security payments made by
the state as employer, and matching payments made by the employ-
ing agency to the State Employee's Retirement Program are not
considered as emoluments. The converse is true as to a monthly
payment made by the state for medical insurance coverage if this
is not reported as salary to the employee.
COUNTIES-COUNTY COMMITTEE-DATE OF MEETINGS
SEPTEMBER 12, 1966
STATE'S ATTORNEY, BURLEIGH COUNTY
Whether the statutory language of section 16-17-10 of the Century
Code, as amended, refers to the third Monday after the September
election or to the third Monday in September
The language "following the primary election" means only that
the county committee shall meet only in those years in which a
primary election is held and is not meant to specify which Monday
in September the meeting is to be held. As a result, the language
"the third Monday in September" is restricted to its ordinary mean-
mg and the county committee will meet on that day in those years
in which a primary election is held.
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STATE-DIRECTOR OF ACCOUNTS AND PURCHASES-CONTROL OVER RATE
OF EXPENDITURES
SEPTEMBER 19, 1966
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTS AND PURCHASES
Whether the Director of Accounts and Purchases may reduce
appropriations through the use of an allotment system as set forth
in section 54-44.1-12 of the Century Code.
The language of this section seems to give the Director of Ac-
counts and Purchases the sole discretion as to such allotments and
sets forth no guidelines or policies. The statute also attempts to
delegate a legislative function thus is perphaps in conflict with
section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution. In view of these ob-
jections, the opinion expresses serious doubt as to the validity of
the section and states "that it would be difficult to defend the
validity of this section."
HEALTH AND SAFETY-NUISANCE-ABATEMENT BY REMOVAL
OF A BUILDING
SEPTEMBER 12, 1966
ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY, BOTTINEAU COUNTY
Whether an alleged health nuisance existing with respect to a
building may be abated by a summary type removal of the building.
Sections 23-05-04, 05, and 06 of the North Dakota Century Code
dealing with abatement of a health nuisance do not authorize re-
moval of buildings but are concerned with matter located on private
property Such matter may be removed and the cost charged against
the property if, after notice is served on the owner, he refuses to
do so. Removal of buildings, however, requires an action in a court
of competent jurisdiction to satisfy the due process requirement.
Such an action to compel abatement of the health nuisance may be
brought under Chapter 42-02 of the Century Code.
The building alleged to be a health hazard may be quarantined
or other similar steps may be taken to protect the public.
AGRICULTURE-DAIRY PRODUCTS-UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN SALE
SEPTEMBER 14, 1966
ACTING DAIRY COMMISSIONER, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1. Whether a privately owned store cutting the prices of milk
is unfairly discriminating in the sale of farm products as against
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other stores within the same city and whether the competitors in
other areas of the state can sell milk under the price set by the
price cutting store without violating the state discrimination laws.
The prohibition against unfair discrimination in the sale of farm
products is set out in section 4-14-04 (Supp. 1965) of the Century
Code. The opinion, not considering the questions of price-fixing or
restraint of trade, concluded that a single store selling below the
prices charged by others would not be in violation of the statute.
Further, if the store's competitors having several outlets sold at all
their outlets at a lower uniform price, there would be no violation.
If, however, the competitors sold at differing prices in each area
except as allowed by statute, there would be discrimination and a
violation of the statute.
2. Whether the privately owned store could be denied the privi-
lege of purchasing milk from the producer until such time as his
prices rise to the same as those charged by the other outlets.
As to this point, the opinion notes that Chapter 4-18 (repealed
by S.L. 1963, ch. 86 § 2; 1963, ch. 87 § 56) makes no requirement
that dairy and cream stations receive or sell milk to all offerors
or that dairies must sell to all members of the general public. As
a result, the opinion concludes that the State Dairy Department is
not "in a position to either require, forbid, or make recommenda-
tions as to whether the individual, one outlet store mentioned, could
be denied the privilege of purchasing milk from the creamery until
such time as his price is the same as other outlets in the city"
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-PURCHASE OF DEPRECIATION
INSURANCE
OCTOBER 1, 1966
CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CASS COUNTY
Whether a county can purchase depreciation insurance which
is over and above the insurance provided for by the State Fire and
Tornado fund?
Under N.D. Cent. Code ch. 26-24, counties and other political
subdivisions are authorized to insure public buildings, their contents
and permanent fixtures with the State Fire and Tornado Fund. It
is a basic rule of law that political subdivisions "have only such
authority as is specifically granted by statute" and powers implied
of necessity from such specific grant. As the Legislature has not
seen fit to grant to the State Fire and Tornado Fund the right to
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issue depreciation insurance, counties and other political subdivisions
have no authority to purchase such insurance, under the above basic
rule of law
STATE AUDITING-APPROVAL OF PAYMENT OF EARNED VACATION TIME
AFTER TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
OCTOBER 6, 1966
SECRETARY, STATE AUDITING BOARD
Whether the payment of earned vacation time to an employee
in the month after his employment terminated with one state agency
can be approved where said employee went to work for another
state agency during said month, and received a full month's salary)
Although N.D. Cent. Code § 54-06-14 (Supp. 1965) sets out some
standards regarding sick leave and annual leave, it leaves the de-
tails of a specific program at the discretion of the particular depart-
ment head (employer). In this case, as employer and employee had
a standing agreement as to the payment of accrued vacation time,
the payment made in the month following termination would be a
legal expenditure.
PARENT AND CHILD-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-NECESSITY
OF RESIDENCE AND DUTY TO SUPPORT
OCTOBER 25, 1966
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC WELFARE BOARD
Under N.D Cent. Code § 27-16-36 (Supp. 1965) the parent who
wishes to petition the juvenile court for termination of parental
rights may do so regardless of whether he (or she) is a resident
of the state. The petition may instead be submitted in the county
in which the child was born or was found.
Where the parental rights are involuntarily terminated by court
order, as provided by N.D. Cent. Code § 27-16-34, and care and
custody are given to the state, a charitable agency, or a suitable
adult person, the parents still have the primary duty to support. If
the parents are unable to support the child, the burden falls on the
county of the child's domicile.
If the child is legally adopted, the natural parents (or previous
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adoptive parents) are relieved of any further duty to support, but
may be liable for accrued and unpaid support costs.
The juvenile court in its termination order may relieve the state
or any particular county of financial responsibility for the dependent
child. However, if the question of duty to support is determined m
judicial proceedings begun for that purpose, the judgment would
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